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Privatization as it has occurred in Russia is not the same phenomenon of
privatization that is occurring in the rest of the world, said Louise
Shelley at a Kennan Institute lecture on 18 November 1996. Shelley,
Professor at the Department of Justice, Law, and Society at the American
University and former Title VIII-Supported Research Scholar, Kennan
Institute, characterized the Russian privatization process as the stealing
of the Russian state.
Privatization in Russia was conducted without the legal safeguards and
controls present in other countries, even other formerly socialist
countries. As a result, the economic wealth of the country became
concentrated in a small number of hands and the workers of privatized
enterprises have been cheated of their rights under Russian law. Shelley
gave as an example the privatization of a typography firm with a desirable
location in central Moscow. By law, the firm was supposed to have gone to
the workers of the firm, but was instead acquired by a major bank that
coveted its prime location. The workers sued in the courts and won, but
the absence of legal enforcement mechanisms left the firm in the hands of
the bank. When the workers showed up to protest, they were met with tanks.
If the privatization process is rife with illegality, Shelley stated, it
was hoped that legal norms would arise afterwards to protect property that
had been privatized. Instead of the emergence of legal norms, however,
there has been an explosion of violence. The recent bombing of an Afghan
War veterans group (whose import tax exemptions attracted organized crime
groups) in a cemetery and the shooting of Paul Tatum, an American partner
of the Radisson-Slavyanskaya hotel in Moscow, are but the latest examples
of how violence is used to resolve disputes.
Another aspect of this theft of the Russian state, according to the
speaker, is the spontaneous privatization of property by the managers of
privatized enterprises. Managers, doubting the ability of their
enterprises to compete in the global economy, strip the valuable assets of
their firms and export or invest that wealth abroad. Workers are thus
first cheated of their right to own a stake in the privatized enterprises
and are then subsequently robbed of their livelihoods when these
enterprises are depleted of the resources necessary to pay wages.
Illegitimate privatization in Russia has far-reaching negative
implications. Unequal wealth and income distribution, lack of recourse to
an effective legal system, and non-transparent privatization processes are
detrimental to long-term economic development in Russia and the evolution
of sound business practices in Russian firms. These factors have provided
instead an economic atmosphere in which organized crime thrives.
The spread of organized crime in the Russian economy did not arrive with
the post-Soviet privatization program, noted Shelley. The phenomenon
dates back to Gorbachev's anti-alcohol campaign, which began during his
first month in office in 1985. The Soviet state had previously derived 10%
of its income from the turnover tax on the sale of alcohol--revenue which
in a very short period of time was transferred to a highly professional
criminal class that satisfied Russian society's demand for alcohol. This
transfer of revenue coincided with Gorbachev's economic reforms
introducing forms of private ownership in the economy such as joint
ventures and cooperatives, providing a window of opportunity for organized
crime's entry into the legitimate economy.
If organized crime is like a cancer throughout the post-Soviet states,
Shelley stated, then different areas are suffering from different types of
cancer. Organized crime in Russia feeds off the most profitable sector of
the economy of the region in which it resides: from real estate and
banking in Moscow, to natural resources and military industry in the
Urals. Where there is little value in the legitimate economy such as in
the Caucasus, organized crime resorts to more traditionally illicit
activities such as auto theft, drugs, and arms smuggling.
Russian privatization and organized crime have created an environment
which is not attractive to foreign investment. Even worse, according to
the speaker, the climate is not conducive to maintaining existing capital
within Russian society. Foreign investment amounts to a few billion
dollars a year, Shelley explained, whereas since 1991 at least $50 billion
of Russian capital have left the country. Half of this capital movement
was in the form of capital flight to more secure investments abroad, half
in the form of money laundering, which demonstrates how corrupt Russian
banks and organized crime are heavily tied into the depletion of the
Russian state.
Organized crime in Russia is distinguished by its pervasive involvement in
the legitimate economy, Shelley stated. The participation of organized
crime in Russia's privatization programs facilitated by the absence of
legal safeguards and the failure of legal norms to emerge have resulted in
the stealing of the Russian state. According to research by the Russian
Ministry of the Interior, over 40,000 privatized enterprises in Russia
have ties to organized crime. This figure is derived from the number of
enterprises involved in criminal investigations which were halted due to
political pressure. "It is a pervasive problem," Shelley concluded, "one
which if you attempt to deny you are not understanding the political
context in which it is occurring...neither law enforcement nor the
judiciary are independent actors within the Russian state."
"Stealing the Russian State: Privatization and Organized Crime" sponsored
by the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, was presented 18
November 1996 by Louise Shelley, Professor, Department of Justice, Law,
and Society, American University, and former Title VIII-Supported Research
Scholar, Kennan Institute. Joseph Dresen is Program Assistant, Kennan
Institute for Advanced Russian Studies.
Comments by Dr. Pytor Joannevich
One should distinguish between the Russian people and the Russian
"Government"/KGB/Mafia cartel that victimizes and exploits this
population. It can be argued that any effort to engage in industrial
development in Russia under present conditions cannot be characterized as
"investing", but rather as an activity more acurrately characterized as
"funding exploitation of the population and depletion of the Russian
state". Russia's GDP has fallen 48% from $1,228.54 billion in 1990 to $638
billion in mid 1996. GDP now consists largely of the export of raw
materials. Participation in Russian "commerce" increasingly implies
becoming an oppressor of the population.
Actual aggregate transfer of resources abroad for the period 1991-1995 was
$300 billion. I project the level for 1997 at between $25-50 billion, all
at the expense of the Russian population.
Purchase of securities, which constitutes most of western involvement
contributes little if anything to GDP and benefits the exploiters.
"Short-selling remains an excellent strategy for profiting from this
chaotic pretense to a 'capital market".
There is the semblance of an economy fueled largely by Western
"demilitariztion policies". At a 5% rate of growth, it requires 15 years
for GDP to double. And as this growth process is not expected to set in
until 1998, pre-reform GDP levels will not be attained until the year
2013. By way of comparison US per capita GDP grew from $10,892 in 1959, to
$22,786 in 1994. This pertains to averages only. The average wages of the
10% of the best-paid workers in Dec of 1995 in Russia were 26 times higher
than the average wages of the 10% of the worst-paid workers, and the
incomes of the richest 10% of Russians were 13.1 times higher than the
incomes of the poorest 10% of Russians. The implication of that
inequality is that while the 'average' Russian will have regained his 1991
living standards sometime after 2013, many many millions of others will
perhaps never regain it and find themselves living at levels considerably
below their counterparts in South America.
Given the 57 year average life expectancy of the Russian male the entire
population of males who were 36 years or older in 1991 will finish out the
remainder of their entire post-reform lives at levels below those they
enjoyed in 1990. However sad the above scenario, it is nonetheless overly
optimistic. It is based on a rate of growth double that of the
US.
As long as the depletion of the Russian State by the "policy-makers"
continues, the prognosis for earning a profit and being able to retain it
will remain bleak.
Dr. Pyotr Joannevich van de Waal-palms
President, Palms & Company, Inc., Investment Bankers
United States of America

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