OLITICAL SITUATION-CENTRAL ASIA.
Page 1(5).

The initial development of the Central Asia's countries foreign policies, and their relations with the Center and with the Russian Federation following the formation of the CIS.

In Turkey, pan-Turkic and pan-Islamic groups, and numerous emigre groups have become ever more active, singing the praises of the idea of the 'Great Turan' stretching from the Mediterranean to the Pamir mountains, and reminding people about the slogans of the united Turko-Islamic Turkestan which existed in the 1920s. In Iran similar groups have recalled more often that the seat of the great Persian power of old Parphia was Nica, i.e. in the Ashkhabad region, and that it was on this basis that the Iranian government had tried to secure the return of Turkmenistan at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The USA and EEC countries have come up with far-reaching plans to make use of Central Asian natural riches, first and foremost oil and gas. The possibilities have also been discussed of using the region's railways to further communications between Europe and the Far East. The links between Russia and the burgeoning independent states of the Islamic East are being studied in detail. A study of the situation in the CIS Asian republics reveals the following picture.

I - Diversity and disparity

There is a great diversity of conditions in these republics; and the socio-political differences between them will be compounded by their rapprochement with other Western and Eastern countries.

The whole Central Asian region can provisionally be divided into two parts - the northern part, namely Kazakstan and Kirghizia, and the south, comprising Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. This division results from past history, social conditions, the degree of influence of Islam, the ethnic makeup of the population and the degree of urbanization.

Up until the beginning of the 1930s the population of Kazakstan and Kirghizia was predominantly nomadic, the influence of Islam was extremely weak and most of the republics had not been affected by urbanization. Apart from this, some districts were populated not by local peoples but to a significant extent by Russian-speakers. This is particularly true of Kazakstan, which gained districts such as the Russian-inhabited East Kazakstan when the Republic of Kazakstan was created from the autonomous Union republic.

In the 1950s when virgin soil was being cultivated, the ethnic makeup of the surrounding countryside towns and various other districts changed significantly. In so far as the number of Kazakhs in Kazakstan does not currently exceed 40 per cent, this naturally forces the government to take an extremely cautious line on nationality issues. So, for example, President Nazarbayev was able to issue a decree stating that all the republic's inhabitants are counted as 'Kazakstanis'.

For this same reason President Akayev of Kirghizia vetoed the Supreme Soviet law which states that all land in the republic belongs to the Kirgiz people, and passed a resolution stating that the land belongs to all peoples resident in Kirghizia. It would be impossible to institute a law like this either in the other Central Asian republics or other regions of the CIS.

The Southern Circle

The southern semi-circle republics - Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan are in a completely different situation.

First of all, they encompass the ancient agricultural oases of Baktriya, Sogdiyany and Khorezm: the vast central seat of the Timurids in the Middle Ages, and the Bukhara, Khiva and Kokand khanates from the eighteenth to nineteenth centuries. Consequently, their population is mainly farmers with traditions of statehood.

Secondly, this region is very strongly influenced by the Sunni branch of Islam; in the countryside this influence was only slightly weakened during the years of Soviet power.

Thirdly, these republics border on Afghanistan and Iran, and their populations are related. So, for example, while 3 million Tajiks live in Tajikistan, there are around 5 million in northern Afghanistan. There are also more than 1 million Uzbeks and 1 million Turkomens. In contrast to the northern semi-circle republics of Kazakstan and Kirghizia, whose feudal-clan leaders had voluntarily asked in the eighteenth century for the Russian Protectorate, the southern semi-circle lands were conquered by Russian troops in bloody battles in the second half of the nineteenth century. Naturally, all this cannot but affect relations between nationalities, and is actively used by nationalist groups.

Fourthly, the southern-circle republics were actually turned into an agrarian appendage to Russia, with disastrous consequences to their ecological and socio-political position. The following facts illustrate the unfairness of the exchange system, which is comparable to colonial exploitation: right up to 1992 Turkmenistan was delivering gas to Russia and Ukraine for 3 kopecks per cubic meter. In April 1992 the government of Turkmenistan stopped gas deliveries to Ukraine because Kiev reneged on earlier agreements stipulating payment of 800 roubles per 1,000 cubic meters of gas (which is half the world price). Up to 1992 Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan were delivering cotton to Russia at the price of 860-1,000 roubles per ton of raw cotton. Under new agreements these independent republics will be selling cotton for 130-230 thousand roubles per ton.

These figures are extraordinarily significant. They help us to understand the economic causes for the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the growth of nationalism. At the same time they are indicative of the serious crisis facing Russia's textile and fuel and energy industries both now and in the long term. To a large extent the figures explain also the bankruptcies in the majority of textile enterprises in the Ivanov district and the manifold attempts by the Russian Federal government to raise prices for energy producers. All these factors contribute in their own way to a deepening economic crisis and exacerbate social tension in the country.