As soon as President Boris Yeltsin came out of the woods after his
recent heart surgery, he demanded back the ''nuclear briefcase'' Prime
Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin held while the President was unconscious.
The
first public mention of the Russian (then Soviet) ''nuclear briefcase'' was
made in the summer of 1991 when during the several days of the August coup
attempt Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev had no control over the country's
strategic nuclear forces. In fact, he was disconnected from a
highly-efficient system of emergency communications, which is commonly known
as the ''nuclear briefcase''. Some time later photographs of that super-secret
''object'' appeared in mass media. What is this mysterious ''nuclear briefcase''?
It is really a small case, or rather, an attache case about 10
centimetres thick. Under its handle is a complicated code-lock and the sides
of the case are reinforced with a band made of a superlight
aluminium-magnesium alloy. This almost weightless and strong edging is said
to have played the decisive role in choosing the receptacle for the ''nuclear
button''. Actually, there is no what we might call a button inside the case.
There is a miniature computer for electronic coding, which specialists rank
as the best in the world, and a computer keyboard. The entire device is easy
to handle and does not require special knowledge from the user. Its chief
designation is control over the county's strategic nuclear forces.
The idea of making such a device first appeared in the late seventies
when there were already powerful weapon systems and systems of control over
them. However, to activate them in an emergency the country's
commander-in-chief (it was normally the head of state) had to arrive at the
central command post. At the same time, the flight time of the potential
enemy's missiles aimed at the USSR was 7 to 10 minutes. In short, there was
no way for the country's leader to arrive at the central command post in
time. That situation required the development of a system that could receive
a radio warning about a missile attack, transmit the corresponding
directions and be always by the side of the country's leader. Hence the main
qualities of that system: it had to be reliable, small and easy to handle.
Such a system was eventually developed in 1985 by a research
institution specialising in space communications.
The ''nuclear briefcase'' operates as follows: linked with the
corresponding radio missile attack warning systems, it is constantly in an
operating position and ready to receive and transmit signals, but can be put
into combat position with the aid of a 10-digit code only after credible
information about an attack has been received. From there the signal goes to
the central command post, where it is coded again and transmitted to all
strategic nuclear forces in the form of coded orders. While nuclear weapons
are prepared for use, the command is verified for identity. When the
strategic nuclear forces are put on combat alert, a coded signal is sent to
and received by the ''nuclear briefcase'', after which a final decision to
strike back may be made.
In Soviet times there were three people who had ''nuclear briefcases'':
the head of state, defence minister and chief of the General Staff. After
the breakup of the USSR the latter was dropped from the list of the ''nuclear
briefcase'' holders. There are several ''briefcases'' not because their holders
want to be able to control each other, but because of the great urgency of
decision-making. Technically, any holder of the ''nuclear briefcase'' can
order a missile launch, but each holder is strictly identified with his own
''briefcase'' and this ensures reliability of control over the strategic
nuclear forces.
Some experts believe that at present Russia continues to do research
to modernise its ''nuclear briefcase'' and that this work is necessitated by
both the development of some technical novelties and the changed political
situation. However, there is reason to believe that the principle of
operation of the entire system will remain the same.
(RIA Novosti)

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