eport from Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
Part 2(2) (CSIS)

U.S. INTERESTS AND GOALS

- The reduction and control of nuclear dangers. Although the West no longer faces the mortal threat of an overwhelming nuclear attack from the Soviet Union, we still are menaced by multiple dangers stemming from the old arsenal. Even after full implementation of the major arms control agreements, dismantling programs, purchases of enriched uranium, and ongoing diplomatic pressure, experts estimate that about 12,000 tactical and strategic nuclear weapons will remain within Russia or at sea. The total number of warheads is currently closer to 20,000. In the hands of terrorists, any one of these weapons could kill hundreds of thousands of people.

Some in Russia see its nuclear arsenal as a sign of continuing great power sta- tus. This attitude, combined with a mood of resisting the West and cost concerns, has placed the implementation of the START 11 reductions at risk. One cannot feel comfortable about nuclear command and control in a world where the Russian military is riddled with rivalries and corruption is rampant. The continuing breakdown of order or a move by one faction to secure leverage (or money) would exacerbate the risks.

Russians assert that they are dismantling about 2,000-3,000 warheads annually. (Outsiders appear unable to confirm these statistics, given Russia's ongoing secrecy on this topic.) Unfortunately, dismantlement creates a new set of problems. A terrorist or renegade nation can build a nuclear weapon with about 33 pounds of weapons-grade uranium or 11 pounds of plutonium; there are tons of these mate- rials in Russia. And we already know of captures of groups seeking to smuggle bomb-grade supplies out of Russia.

These nuclear dangers are complemented by the risks of civilian nuclear reac- tors in the states of the former Soviet Union. Given the poor designs, aging facilities, and likelihood of worker mistakes, another Chernobyl-type disaster is a real possibility.

Finally, the pressure to earn hard currency and to employ nuclear experts has led to sharp differences between Russia and the United States about building nuclear plants in Iran. Enhancing Iran's nuclear capabilities is a definite threat to U.S. and Russian security.

- The prevention (or limitation) of a militant Russia that threatens European, Asian, or Gulf stability. For at least the past three centuries, Russia has been a major participant in European politics and security. Since the late eighteenth century, Russia's acquisition of vast lands in Asia has also made it a force in Asian affairs.

Over the past two centuries, Russian armies have swept across Europe, marching through Paris, Berlin, and a host of other capitals. In turn, a French army occupied Moscow and a German one came within view of the Kremlin's spires. Russia's fleets clashed disastrously with Japan's navy at the opening of this century, but by mid-century Russia's armies had returned to seize the northern islands of Japan.

No country is totally bound by its history. But size and geography cannot be ignored. The fact is that Russia remains a powerful potential force, for good or ill, throughout Europe and Asia.

It would be to our advantage to have Russia as a partner in the twenty-first century. Many of the political and security challenges we face will be found around the rim of Russia, from North Korea to an emerging China, onward through possible conflicts in South Asia and the Islamic world of Central Asia, and on to destabilizing regimes in the Gulf, the Middle East, and the Balkans. If Russia shares our objectives, our likelihood of success will be enhanced.

While Russian support would be important, it is vital that Russia not reemerge as a threat to European, East Asian, or Gulf stability. It is in America's geopolitical interest that no nation dominate Europe or East Asia, as the Soviet Union threatened to do. Europe and East Asia are America's primary economic partners. We are also bound to them, especially Europe and Japan, through shared political systems. In sum, Europe and East Asia, in combination with the countries of our own hemisphere, are our probable primary partners no matter what unforeseen challenge awaits us. Russia is the only country that could potentially threaten our partners across both the Atlantic and Pacific.

Russia's policies toward Iran, Iraq, and the other states of the Gulf could also threaten stability and peace in the Middle East, another area of vital interest to the United States and a region easily prone to competition and conflict.

- The establishment of mutually respectful, non-threatening relations between a sovereign, independent Ukraine and Russia. Russia's relations with Ukraine are fundamental to the future of European stability. If Ukraine were reabsorbed by Russia, the shock waves would rattle Poland and Germany. Increased German anx- ieties would affect all of the European Union. If Russia asserted control over Ukraine, Russia's Western neighbors would perceive that the pendulum of history was swinging back, that Russia was reasserting its interests over the lands between it and Germany.

Although most Russians do not accept what they consider to be Ukraine's temporary secession, the Russian government has followed a generally prudent course with Ukraine. Russia has not permitted potential conflicts over the Crimea and the division of the Black Sea fleet to slip out of control.

Some of Russia's restraint may be traceable to its internal problems; it does not have the energy or resources to take on the problems of a Ukraine that has become an economic basket case. At the same time, one major concern has been elimi- nated. On June 1, 1996, Ukraine sent the last of its 4,400 nuclear warheads to Russia as mandated by the 1994 tripartite Ukraine-United States-Russia accord. Moreover, President Leonid Kuchma's statements seem to point toward a gradual rapprochement between the two countries. The Russian security elite probably assume that the relative disinterest of the United States and the European Union will preclude efforts to integrate Ukraine with the West, opening the way for eventual reintegration with Russia.

It is certainly not clear whether the United States and the Europeans would use force to defend Ukraine against Russia, at least at this point. But Ukraine will probably not face an overt, direct threat in any event. Its greater danger is political and territorial fragmentation after economic collapse. Therefore, the prerequisite for Ukraine's future as an independent state is a successful economic and political reform program. And it is in the strong interest of the United States and Europe that Ukraine's reform efforts succeed.

If it establishes the basis for independence through a sound economy, Ukraine should seek respectful relations with Russia as well as ties to the Western community. Ukraine could demonstrate to Russia that security can be based on mutually beneficial economic ties with a non-threatening neighbor. This relationship would offer Russia a model of bilateral cooperation, as opposed to the model of domination of peripheries through groups like the Commonwealth of Independent States.

- Russia's development of the rule of law, a market economy, and democracy. As noted above, we want to prevent Russia from becoming a threat to European and Asian stability. But we also should not ignore the potential benefits of a democratic Russia for the international system; Russia could become a strong partner, following the pattern of Germany and Japan after World War II.

Our ability to affect the course of Russian internal events is, of course, limited. Nevertheless, relatively small amounts of aid to reformers and others seeking to build a civic society could be meaningful.

One dimension of this support is to offer Russia opportunities to participate within transatlantic, European, and global political and economic structures. It is not in our interest to isolate Russia. Economically, Russia has vast potential. Politically, Russia has the ability to impede our pursuit of many other objectives. If Russia decides to isolate itself, that should be because of Russia's choice and actions, not ours.

- Preservation of the independence of the Baltic states. While the Baltic states may not have the same geopolitical weight as Ukraine, they rank high in Western calculations of Russian behavior. Increasingly tied to the West through their own efforts and Scandinavian support, any Russian threat to Baltic independence would disrupt Russia's relations with Europe and the United States.

Accordingly, it is also important that the Baltics should seek to develop cooperative relations with Russia, including through the treatment of Russian minorities in accord with the standards of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe. The Baltics' best hope for security is a peaceful, democratic Russia that cooperates with the European Union and the United States.

- Russian respect for the sovereignty of Kazakhstan and the other states of the former Soviet Union. The U.S. interests in Ukraine and the Baltic states are worthy of special attention. Yet it is also important that Russia respect the sovereignty of Kazakhstan and the remaining states of the former Soviet Union. In different ways, these states could become a test of whether Russians intend to build a peaceful, democratic nation or to rebuild an empire.

It would be normal for Russia to establish strong economic ties with these countries. These links may even evolve into political frameworks, as they have in Europe. But influence and integration should not translate into domination and absorption.

Although the direct U.S. interest in the survival of these new states may not seem great, small efforts could turn out to be significant both for the countries involved and to signal to Russia what course of interaction is appropriate. In particular, these states' independence could benefit greatly in light of opportunities to transport oil and gas exports through pipelines or water routes outside Russia. The West, in turn, would benefit from diversified access routes for energy supplies.

- Maintenance of stable relations between Russia and China. Russia is weak. China is the rising power in Asia. In the past, such an asymmetry between two large nations bordering one another could lead to tension, even conflict. Frankly, it is surprising that most Russian officials seem relatively inattentive to this potential security problem. Given the size of China's population and the sparse settlement of Russians in the east, Russia might have some anxiety about the future.

It is in the U.S. interest for China and Russia to remain at peace. A conflict between them could be damaging to stability. At the same time, we should be careful about pursuing policies that lead the two to cooperate in challenging Western regimes. We do not want Russia and China to become the leaders of a movement against current efforts to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protect the environment, encourage trade and investment, or for other purposes.

The prevention of Russian obstructionism of U.S. and Western policies in the UN and elsewhere. Russia is not likely to attain the diplomatic reach of the former Soviet Union in world affairs. But Russia still retains considerable ability to obstruct U.S. efforts. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia still wields considerable influence. Therefore, regardless of developments inside Russia, we should work with Russia to elicit mutual cooperation.

As the Soviet Union vanished, succeeded in part by a Russia that launched a wave of reforms, many Americans saw great promise in a new Russo-American partnership of democracies. During this phase of relations, the United States succeeded in pressing its interests in Europe, the Gulf, the Middle East, and elsewhere with Russian support or at least acceptance. But over time, certain old Russian behavior has reasserted itself. Now the challenge is to avoid a swing from romanticism to resignation about Russia. What will continue to be needed is realistic engagement.

Realistic engagement. Russia's future is highly uncertain. While our ability to affect the internal course of events in Russia may be modest, we should not fail to pursue opportunities that appear. Equally important, we should encourage Russia to engage in constructive international behavior. At the same time, we need to prepare for the eventuality that Russia might slip toward authoritarian government and adversarial external policies.

Whether Russia becomes democratic or authoritarian, we should convey clearly both our steadfast commitment to forwarding our interests and our willingness to cooperate with Russia if it avoids acting in ways that threaten international security and geopolitical stability. Internal Russian political debates should not deter us from pursuing our interests. Not only are we unlikely to influence the course of events inside Russia, but a retreat from pursuit of our interests is likely to trigger miscalculations, both inside and outside Russia, that will result in unintended and unwanted consequences.

In sum, our policies toward Russia, Ukraine, and the other states of the former Soviet Union must take into account the larger geopolitical context in which we are operating. Russia can be a significant force in both European and Asian affairs. At the same time our dealings with Russia should not be at the expense of the development of other post-Cold War arrangements. While we should reach out to Russia, we should also take steps to ensure against a Russia that is not friendly to us or our allies.

- Reduced nuclear risks. Given the centrality of the nuclear issues to our national interests, this is a top-priority topic for U.S. policy. The Bush and Clinton administrations made significant headway in forging agreements to cut strategic and tactical nuclear weapons and then to help implement these arrangements.

Early arrangements eliminated between 5,000 and 12,000 Russian tactical nuclear weapons (plus 6,400 American weapons). Once the few nuclear weapons that remain in Belarus have been removed (as they were from Ukraine and Kazakhstan), only one nuclear weapons state will remain following the fragmentation of the Soviet Union. The START I Treaty reduces U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces about 40 percent, to approximately 6,000 warheads for each. Once START 11 is ratified by Russia, each side's arsenal will be cut to no more than 3,500 warheads, a two-thirds reduction from the Cold War highs.

We have a strong interest in working with Russia to translate these agreements into actual dismantlement and safe provisions for the nuclear materials. Regardless of other developments with Russia, we should support Russian efforts to inventory, safeguard, and eventually dispose of these components. In particular, the United States should affirm and maintain momentum for the Nunn-Lugar initiative. We should overcome bureaucratic impediments to additional purchases of enriched uranium. And we should promptly urge remedies to weaknesses in Russian storage and protection policies.

The theft of highly enriched Russian uranium represents a serious global secu- ity threat. It is strongly in our interest to arrange for the transfer of much of that uranium to America for safe storage or manufacture into commercial lowenriched reactor fuel in accordance with agreements already accepted in principle by both countries. Full implementation of these "swords into plowshares" agreements is a serious priority that should be executed expeditiously, using national security as the operative frame of reference rather than commercial considerations.

The United States has taken the lead in projects to address nuclear weapons activities in the former Soviet Union. All G-7, NATO, and EU countries should move this issue to the top of their agendas with Russia. To preserve Russian sensitivities, we should be willing to work through special International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) or other multilateral arrangements or to consider reciprocal arrangements.

The United States and the EU have had difficulty coordinating their actions with regard to nuclear power plants in Russia and the former Soviet Union. In part, these problems reflected intra-EU squabbles. Also, reports of German firms interfering with U.S. contracts in Eastern Europe undercut U.S. willingness to finance multi-billion dollar construction projects.

It is not clear that Russia would need its nuclear plants if it moved to market prices for energy and instituted conservation measures. Any solution for the nuclear plants should be in the context of overall energy policies and pricing. In the meantime, the United States and the EU should coordinate to ensure that current operational procedures are as safe as possible and that these rules are applied.

We and our allies also should seek to persuade Russia to avoid any actions that will lead to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, Russia should recognize that the dangers could be great for itself if neighbors, such as Iran, gain nuclear arms.

Support for Ukraine's reforms and independence. As noted above, Ukraine's success may be the single most important determinant of Russia's peaceful integra- tion into a new, larger Euro-Atlantic community. Therefore, the West should (1) back up Ukrainian self-help policies with tangible support from both the interna- tional financial institutions and bilaterally; and (2) convey to Russia that appropriate behavior toward Ukraine is a prerequisite for Russia's economic, political, and security integration with the West.

At the same time, we should explain to Ukrainians that they should not antago- nize Russia. Ukrainians, Balts, and others must not assume that the United States will completely bail them out of trouble, especially if it stems from a series of differences with Russia that are subject to reasonable compromises. The solution for Ukraine, Russia, and the transatlantic nations is for all to treat one another respecfully, in full accord with international norms.

Trade and aid for Russia. We have already noted our ongoing interest in funding to reduce the nuclear threat. In addition, the United States should devote modest sums to support the development of economic and political reforms and a civil society.

Russia's transition will take decades, and we are unlikely to be able to sustain large-scale aid for many years. So we should reformulate our aid for longer-term engagement. The larger economic support effort should be financed by the multilateral institutions, which the United States has financed significantly over past years. Small bilateral grants, properly targeted, can go a long way in supporting the development of effective legislatures, a free press, and the development of reform parties. While the returns are uncertain, the gains could prove to be very large.

Russia's longer-term economic success depends on its effective interconnection with the world economy. Private, not governmental, capital flows are critical. At present, most investors face enormous political, legal, and market risks, so they are hesitant. But Russia has great potential, starting with raw materials, energy supplies, and primary products that can earn foreign exchange. The rest of the world should be sure the door is open for trade so that Russian exporters have a future.

Our efforts to broaden the outlook of Russian political society should extend beyond the reformist factions to reach the so-called "centrists." These are the groups that may turn out to hold the key to the political balance. We should also engage the Russian military, who are likely to be important in future internal crises or in Russian debates about external policies. We should aim to overcome the military's sense of international isolation and victimization.

- European security arrangements. As discussed in the paper on U.S. interna- tional security strategy (appendix E), we support the expansion of NATO and the enlargement of the EU to encompass certain democracies in Central and Eastern Europe. While some Russians will resent NATO's (and possibly the EU's) enlarge- ment, we believe it would be a mistake to let them override our interests in securing a stable, democratic Central and Eastern Europe, increasingly integrated within the transatlantic communities. Indeed, it is important to make clear to Russia, in a non-hostile fashion, that we do not accept that Russia has a right to treat Central and Eastern Europe as its sphere of influence. Nor do we wish to leave Central and Eastern Europe as vulnerable borderlands between Russia and Germany.

At the same time, we should acknowledge that Russia will have a place in Euro- pean security affairs, as a matter of fact if not of formal treaty. We should seek to make Russia's involvement cooperative, not challenging. And we should be open- minded about institutional changes to achieve this result.

Russia seems to have focused on four issues that define its relations with the West. It wants (1) the West to make clear that it does not consider Russia the enemy; (2) new structures so that Russia can participate in the transatlantic community's consideration of security issues; (3) clear expectations on the arms trade that do not leave Russia out; and (4) to avoid NATO deployment patterns (e.g., nuclear weapons, new forces moved eastward) that threaten Russian security.

The U.S. and European governments should suggest creative solutions to address these Russian concerns. Some might be dealt with through a NATO-Russia treaty or charter that is both declarative of intentions and practical in establishing consultative arrangements. Another option is to create new consultative arrange- ments involving a subset of OSCE nations (perhaps with rotational leadership). In devising these mechanisms for Russia's engagement, we should assume a posture similar to the one we took toward the Soviet Union during German unification: we should promote opportunities for Russia to take part while making it clear that we will proceed in any event. If Russia isolates itself from a cooperative approach toward European security, that result should stem from its own decision, not from our failure to reach out.

We also need to state to Russia, without ambiguity, that our future engagement with it on security matters depends in significant part on Russia's willingness to abide by past treaty commitments. In particular, Russia should not take unilateral action that violates the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) agreement.

We hope Russia can be a partner of the West in the future. We believe Russia's engagement with, and participation in, regional and global security, economic, and political arrangements would be mutually beneficial. So we want to make sure that opportunity is clearly understood.

At the same time, we recognize that Russia's decisions to participate with us depend heavily on internal developments. Russia must make these choices for itself. We do not serve Russia's interests or our own interests by failing to state clearly what we expect the terms of this engagement to be.

We suggest that we continue to stress our support for Russia's internal reforms, but that we convey that regardless of Russia's form of government we expect its external behavior to conform to certain requirements. These requirements would match the interests that we have noted as most important. They would include support against nuclear proliferation and the acceptance of the independence of Ukraine, the Baltics, and the other Newly Independent States, as well as the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. In assessing Russia's cooperation, however, we should not apply a tougher test to Russia than we apply to our traditional allies.

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