eport from Center for Strategic and
International Studies.
Part 1(2) (CSIS)

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
in Washington DC recently released a major new foreign policy study.
In CSIS's words:

"The report represents the culmination of a two-year study chaired by Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Senator Dick Lugar, and Congressman Lee Hamilton, and involving more than 50 top foreign policy experts from a range of disciplines. It provides a strong and much-needed wake-up call at a time of diminished public interest in international affairs."

The report is titled "Foreign Policy into the 21st Century: The U.S. Leadership Challenge." Here we reproduce the section on "Russia and the Newly Independent States" and Appendix C which is the detailed report of the "Working Group on Russia and the Newly Independent States."

Members of the Working Group (and their CSIS bios):

Robert Zoellick, chair and principal author
(CSIS Senior Associate;
former Undersecretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs;
former Counselor, U.S. Department of State.)

Keith Bush
(CSIS Senior Associate in Russian and Eurasian Studies;
former Director of Radio Liberty Research.)

Andrew Carpendale
(Former Deputy Director of Policy Planning, U.S. Department of State.)

Paula Dobriansky
(Former Director of European and Soviet Affairs, National Security Council.)

James Goldgeier
(Professor of Political Science, The George Washington University.)

Walter Laqueur
(Holder of the CSIS Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security Policy;
Chairman of the Board of Editors of the Washington Quarterly;
former Director of the Institute of Contemporary History in London.)

Thomas Navratil
(Foreign Service Officer, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Department of State;
former International Affairs Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations.)

William Odom
(Director of National Security Studies, Hudson Institute;
former Director of the National Security Agency.)

Brad Roberts
(Institute for Defense Analyses;
former CSIS Fellow in International Security Studies and Editor of the Washington Quarterly.)

"Foreign Policy into the 21st Century:
The U.S. Leadership Challenge."

RUSSIA AND THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES

Taken together, the challenges confronting Russia and the Newly Independent States (NIS) border on the overwhelming: converting to a market economy from one historically based on strict price controls and centralized economic planning establishing democratic societies where they have not previously existed; and developing "normal" as opposed to hierarchical relationships between Russians and the non-Russian segments of the former Soviet empire. Any one of these challenges would represent a tall order in and of itself. That these countries are dealing not only with a collapse of empire and severe economic distress, but a failed ideology as well (and all that this suggests in term s of social readjustment), compounds the difficulties.

As the Russia/NIS working group under the leadership of former under secretary of state Robert Zoellick suggests in appendix C, there are three plausible scenarios relating to future developments in Russia:

(1) muddling through the reform process, eventually developing a relatively stable democracy and market economy,

(2) continued weakening of the state and society in which neither the reformers nor their opponents prove capable of forging a new system, and

(3) a general resurgence of authoritarianism, either individual or bureaucratic, in response to the frustrations of the first scenario or the fears of the second.

Despite the differences of these widely varying scenarios, the near-term implications for Russia's external policies are essentially the same for each. Russia's primary security objective will be to preserve the territory of the Russian Federation- no small task considering the ethnic tensions and secessionist tendencies that have already arisen and that are unlikely to disappear anytime soon.

Of almost equal importance in Russia's security calculus is the stability and pro-Russian orientation of the other states of the former Soviet Union, or, as they are collectively labeled, the "Near Abroad." This concern underlies Russia's current emphasis on developing and strengthening the institutions of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), particularly as they relate to the integration of military capabilities, air defenses, and border controls. In this context, the geographic range of Russian interests varies from the Caucasus, which are seen as providing a strategic buffer against Iran and Turkey (and militant Islam), to the Caspian Sea with its immense natural resources, to the Baltics with their important "window on the sea." In each of these areas, protecting the rights of the "Russian minorities" offers a convenient rationale for intervening militarily if political cost is deemed commensurate with probable gain.

Lagging far behind the above objectives for the Russians is that of maintaining cooperative relations with the West. Although the effectiveness of Western assistance has always been dependent on Russian self-help, the romanticized expectations of major Western aid have since fallen prey to disillusion; and now many Russians think the West has not only misled them, but is seeking to weaken them through deliberate manipulation.

With these Russian interests in mind, the corresponding vital interests of the United States include first and foremost the reduction and secure control (by Russia) of Russia's nuclear arsenal. After the major arms control agreements that have already been negotiated are fully implemented and the full effect of ongoing dismantlement programs is felt, it is estimated that the Russians will still have about 3,500 strategic and 8,000 nonstrategic nuclear warheads distributed throughout the country (or at sea). And herein lies a real dilemma: with these weapons left intact, the command and control capability of a disintegrating empire creates a level of concern that did not exist even when the numbers of weapons were considerably higher. Dismantled, on the other hand, the component parts, especially the weapons-grade fuel, can become vulnerable to acquisition by terrorist groups and renegade states if not disassembled and stored under very tight controls.

A second vital interest is to avert (or limit) the threat that a future resurgent and militant Russia would pose to Europe, Asia, or stability in the Gulf. As Zoellick notes, "Russia is the only country that could potentially threaten our partners across both the Atlantic and Pacific."

Underlying each of the above concerns is a more general uncertainty relating to the actual size of the problem. When Kazakhstan asked the United States to remove and store its highly enriched uranium, the U.S. government recovered 104 percent of its declared inventory. As Senator Lugar pointed out at the time, "Consider the implications of a 4 percent error margin in the Russian inventory."

Heading the category of important U.S. interests relating to Russia and the NIS is a successful reform program in Russia leading to democracy and a free market system. Another important U.S. interest is the continuation of peaceful relations between Russia and Ukraine. As Zbigniew Brzezinski has long championed, a free and independent Ukraine is not only fundamental to the future of European stability, it is the sine qua non in avoiding renewed Russian imperialism. Critical to Ukraine's success as an independent state is an effective economic and political reform program.

Additional important interests include stable relations between Russia and China, the continued independence of the Baltic states, and Russian respect for the sovereignty of the remaining Newly Independent States.

At the level of a beneficial interest is Russian cooperation with Western poli- cies in the United Nations and elsewhere.

The following policy guidance is offered:

- Pursue a course of realistic engagement with Russia. Whether Russia becomes democratic or reverts to authoritarianism, we should pursue our interests in cooperation with the Russian Federation to the extent that proves possible. While we should reach out to Russia wherever we can, we should also hedge against the possibility that future relations could sour, combining firmness with conciliation.

- On the nuclear front,
(a) pursue with renewed commitment the Nunn-Lugar "swords into plowshares" initiative,
(b) to the maximum extent feasible, purchase additional enriched uranium from Russia and the NIS,
(c) promote measures to strengthen Russian/ NIS nuclear storage and protection policies, and (d) prevail on Russia to withhold nuclear technology from states with questionable inten- tions, such as Iran.

- Continue support for Ukrainian self-help policies both bilaterally and through international financial institutions.

- Reformulate U.S. aid to Russia for longer-term engagement, looking to the multilateral institutions for general economic support while targeting small bilateral grants at specific helpful initiatives such as institutionalizing a free press. An added component is the task of opening Western doors to Russian trade.

- Offer to address Russian concerns relating to prospective NATO expansion through creative mechanisms such as a NATO-Russia treaty or charter that recognizes and, to the extent appropriate, accommodates Russia's interests and the specificity of its concerns, and/or alternative consultative arrangements perhaps involving a subset of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), with rotational leadership.

Because of the immense domestic hurdles Russia is traversing, there is an understandable tendency among Western policymakers to discount Russian concerns in other policy areas. Russia, while weakened, remains a formidable military power and is unlikely to forget slights, however unintended. At the same time, it is important that we remain assertive in pursuing (1) our own interests, particularly those relating to nuclear proliferation, (2) our need to develop theater and (as needed) national missile defenses, and (3) the continued independence of the nations of Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States.

Appendix C: Russia and the Newly Independent States.

(Note: This paper draws in part on ideas set forth in the Trilateral Commission's June 1995 report Engaging Russia, by Robert Blackwill, Roderick Braithwaite, and Akihiko Tanaka.)

Russia, Ukraine, and the other states of the former Soviet Union are struggling through one of the great transformations of the twentieth century. Frankly, no one knows where the changes will lead.

Some see historical analogies in the fragmentation in recent centuries of the great multinational Eurasian empires, such as the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman, whose residual conflicts still plague us. But the breakdown and breakup of the Soviet Union was more than the end of an empire. It was also the collapse of a momentous idea, Soviet communism, which had merged one branch of nine- teenth-century universalist and "scientific" thought with a reactionary Slavophile movement. So Russians have to cope with more than the dissolution of empire; they also must free themselves from the economic and political wreckage of this failed ideology. The upheaval is so great that even the most basic principles of societal organization are now the subject of daily debate and experimentation.

It is difficult to comprehend how Russians are dealing with this shock. We are not even sure that there is a distinguishing core to which they can retreat. As Count Witte, a turn-of-the-century Czarist reformer explained, "No such thing as Russia exists, there is only the Russian empire." Raised in the belief that they were the privileged people of an exceptional nation, the Russians today suffer humiliation, to say nothing of economic deprivation.

Russians have inherited little to help them face their new political and eco- nomic experiment. They have had no democratic experience, no rule of law, no real history of parliaments or separation of powers, no familiarity with property rights, no free press, and no civic society. But they are demonstrating once again the extraordinary Russian ability to endure.

For Russia's diplomatic and defense establishment, the jolt must be even more terrible. Although they recognized the need for change in the 1980s, they had expected to be able to both modernize and retain their great power status. Instead, over only a few years, these proud leaders lost their nation, form of government, economic system, much of their people and territory-all that they had believed in. This took place without any great battle, or even a small one. No conqueror prevailed over their security precautions. It just seemed to happen.

Given this context, one could argue that Russia's recent adjustments and achievements are astounding. Amidst the turmoil, we can identify some signs of reforms taking hold. Individual Russians stand out as people of principle, courage, and commitment to political ideas that most citizens in Western societies take for granted. Others offer vivid testament to the belief that the invisible hand of markets will perform wonders if only it is unleashed. But the chaos has unleashed darker forces as well, in particular a cancer of crime that-eats away at legitimate society to a frightening degree.

Although Russia's future is uncertain, we assess its possibilities with respect. Russia is a land of great potential. Its people are highly educated. It enjoys vast natural resources. And Russia has a tradition of rising above calamities of man and nature to exert great influence over Europe and Asia.

We cannot determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what will happen within Russia over the rest of this decade. The July 1996 reelection of Boris Yeltsin over a communist provided many in the West with a sense of relief; now, however, Mr. Yeltsin and his government must return to the business of economic reform, fighting crime and social breakdowns, and building a civic society.

For purposes of analysis, however, it is useful to consider three possible scenarios. They are not mutually exclusive.

- "Muddling through" reforms. There is some reasonable probability that Russia could continue to "muddle through" the reform process, eventually developing a relatively stable market economy and democracy. By "muddle through," we mean a series of actions, some of which may seem inconsistent, that eventually produces a satisfactory result. If this transformation occurs, it will take a long time, and the passage will involve many ups and downs.

Most prices are now relatively free in Russia. And the government, including the central bank, at least keeps trying to get inflation under some form of control. While many people are poor, shops are opening, long lines are gone, people are learning how markets work, and property is being transferred (in one way or another) from the state to individuals or groups. Some reports suggest that production has bottomed out, although government statistics are notoriously unreliable.

One could argue that the turmoil reflects the necessary breakdown of the old communist system. indeed, much of the lost production was for useless, or even counterproductive, purposes in any event. Each day that finds more people with their own personal property, or stake, in the new society, the harder it will be to reverse the changes.

On the political front, a free press, while under threat, seems to be supported by a general audience. Despite setbacks, some reformers still persevere in the central government. Others are trying to create models in cities and regions away from Moscow. The breakdown of old power structures has created a de facto decentralization of authority, opening the way for greater regionalism within Russia. The Duma functions in a crude fashion. President Yeltsin has amassed significant formal powers, but his idiosyncratic and fitful style of governing still leaves openings for reformers. One of the reformers' hopes is that the military remains divided and would-be authoritarians continue to fail to tap any groundswell of support from a public that seems disillusioned with everyone.

Nevertheless, the rampant crime, the great disparities between the few rich and the great mass of Russians, the collapse of the health care system, even the everyday struggle for survival leaves Russians thoroughly dissatisfied with the reform process. The various reform factions remain deeply divided by differences of personality and recent history. In sum, although political and economic reform might muddle along, it must proceed from a very unsteady base.

0 Continuing weakening of the state and society. A second possible scenario is that the disintegration of the old Communist and Soviet state will continue, but that neither reformers nor their opponents will prove capable of forging a new system. In this scenario, governments may issue orders and parliaments may pass legislation, but words are not translated into actions. In the absence of the rule of law, individuals and groups are forced to relate to one another through ties of kinship, custom, and power relations.

In this event, the mediating institutions of a civic society fail to take root. Crime becomes even more rampant. Protection societies substitute crudely for law and order. Business may take the form of active trading or barter, with high risk premiums, but few are willing to invest in an economy where property rights are highly uncertain and time horizons are measured in days, not years.

The military, already deeply split, could lose any of its lingering cohesion and fragment into the modern version of private armies. Nuclear weapons, or pluto- nium, would become an actively tradeable resource on the world market. This breakdown could lead to a condition of "warlordism" or even forms of civil strife.

The further breakdown of state and society could also lead to territorial frag- mentation. Various regions-whether stirred by nationalism, religions, or just a sense they are better off on their own-might quit responding to the central authorities. Other parts of Russia might even assert their independence, as Chechnya did.

A scenario of generalized anarchy would be highly threatening to U.S. interests. The dangers from nuclear and other weapons proliferation are obvious. In addition, internal conflicts, or economic and ecological disasters flowing from them, could trigger immensely disruptive migrations. Weakness might tempt those neighbors eager to seek territories, buffer regimes, or other advantages.

While this scenario is not likely, it cannot be discarded altogether. The continuing chaos, the absence of order, and the threats to the cohesion of Russia itself could motivate Russians to demand a stronger hand and invite leaders eager to exercise it.

- Authoritarianism: individual and bureaucratic. The frustrations of the first scenario, or the fears arising from the second, could prompt an authoritarian response in Russia. Indeed, one can imagine authoritarian efforts to counter both the frustration of a muddling-through reform process and a state and society that are continuing to weaken.

The average Russian lives in fear of mafias and massive shifts in economic forces outside his or her control. Given Russia's authoritarian tradition, a convincing leader could probably gain significant public support, at least for a time. There is no shortage of internal and external enemies against which authoritarians might rally the citizenry. This "strong hand" approach might rely on crude nationalist appeals to build power.

Such an authoritarian political system might be used to continue the imple- mentation of market reforms. Or it might be used to try to preserve the prerogatives of some of the old captains of the command economy. An authoritarian nationalist might also seek to build and expand power at the expense of neighbors and outsiders.

Nevertheless, efforts by individuals to recentralize authority face obstacles. Even the relatively minor conflict in Chechnya demonstrates how hard it is to reimpose Moscow's will over independent groups and regions. No one trusts authorities in Russia. Government only seems able to reassert itself through the imposition of power, perhaps abetted by weaknesses that stem from local quarrels.

Consistent with this lack of legitimate authority, it is likely that various institutions of state control will seek to reextend their reach gradually. They will enhance their assets through crime and corruption. With these assets, organs of the state will seek to make and break leaders who can dispense favors. Rather than aim for total control through one leader, the near-term objectives of these institutional societies will probably be simply to survive and to maintain opportunistic influence for their members come what may.

None of these three scenarios, standing alone, has a particularly strong possibility of realization. In coming years, we are most likely to encounter a blurred combination of all three. Moreover, we have little influence over which scenario is likely to come about, although our preference for "muddling through" warrants some effort to shape the future. In any event, the near-term implications for Russia's external policies are basically similar under all three scenarios. - Preserving Russia. At present and probably for some time, Russia's primary security objective is to preserve the territory of the Russian Federation. As Chechnya demonstrates, Russia has not yet firmly established the residual of the old empire. Russia's political and military leaders are well aware that internal threats, especially if combined with external support, could further dismember their state. Given their recent experience, they will take nothing for granted.

- Reintegrating the "Near Abroad." Second, and close behind, Russians per- ceive a vital interest in the stability and pro-Russian orientation of the other states of the former Soviet Union. These areas constitute the so-called Near Abroad. In particular, no Russian government will retreat from asserting its interest in the more than 20 million ethnic Russians who live in these states. While Russian policies toward these countries will vary according to circumstances, the immediate national concern is that these neighbors operate in a way conducive to the security and stability of Russia. Russia is already seeking to "reintegrate" them through one means or another. In particular, Russia is pressing to develop and strengthen the institutions of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in areas such as border controls, air defense, and integrated militaries.

More specifically, while Russia has acted with restraint towards Ukraine, many Russians see the separation as artificial given the ethnic, historical, and psychological links, and they expect that the pulls of Mother Russia will eventually unite them again. Russia's interests in the Caucasus are motivated by the region's position as a strategic buffer between Iran and Turkey (and Islamic extremism) on the one side and Russia on the other: the mountains to the south approximate one of Russia's few natural land frontiers, and Russia is intent on dominating both sides of this barrier. Moreover, the prospect of great natural resource wealth in the Caspian basin motivates Russia to resecure domination over it. In the states further east, Russia is concerned with protecting ethnic Russians, acquiring natural resources, and warding off Islamic expansion; for now, Russia's policies towards these countries are likely to emphasize containing threats, securing bases for future initiatives, and gaining leverage over resources. Finally, while the Baltics have achieved a special status because of expressions of Western interest, Russians still know these territories as a "window on the sea" they worked for centuries to acquire. Moreover, Latvia and Estonia have large Russian populations, which, in Russian eyes, suffer at the hands of their new countrymen. At a minimum, Russians will expect the Baltic states to take no actions that impinge on Russia's security.

- Preserving ties with the West. Cooperative relations with the West are now a distant third on Russia's priority list. Both the Russian leaders and people are deeply disappointed by what they believe was the West's failure to deliver on its promises of strategic partnership and material support.

The prevailing view of Russian leaders is that the United States and Western Europe want a one-way street: a Russian retreat in Europe and help in Iraq and elsewhere, without any commensurate sensitivity to Russia's interests or need for respect. In Russian eyes, when Russians sell arms, the West complains that it is destabilizing; when the Western powers ship arms, it is for self-defense and order. Russians perceive that Americans want to stop Russia from building the same type of nuclear plant for Iran that Americans and South Korea will build for North Korea. The West warns Russia not to act too vigorously to counter security risks in the Caucasus, from the Islamic world, and even inside Russia itself, but the West does nothing to help. Until the Russians forced their way into the negotiations among Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia, Russians perceived no evidence that the West considered their interests. Of course, there are contrary explanations of all these events. And some Russian leaders recognize that generally positive relations with the West are likely to be important for Russia's status and to help achieve future economic well being. But the prospects are wearing thin.

The Russian people believe Western promises have been cynical. They never saw the aid, although they believed it showed up in the hands of the criminals. The foreign economic advisers seemed oblivious to Russia's unique conditions and became enmeshed in Kremlin intrigues. In Russian eyes, Western markets never opened up, except to exploit Russia. For the average Russian, the West never meant to help; some suspect the West actually manipulated Russia to weaken it.

These views often do not stand up to hard factual scrutiny. In reality, the task of overhauling Russia's economic and political systems has been a staggering chal- lenge, and the responsibility for the result has always rested primarily with the Russians themselves. The effect of Western help is dependent on Russian self-help. Nevertheless, many Russians, having started this new age with romanticized expectations, now feel let down by outsiders.

Moreover, the Russian security elite sees the European Union and NATO mov- ing closer to its borders, while still keeping Russia at arms' length. These people view the nations of Central and Eastern Europe not as stable independent states, but as the lands between Germany and Russia, a region of shifting borders, transplanted peoples, and past invasion routes. At a minimum, Russia expects to have a say in this area; it would prefer a sphere of influence.

- Facing East. Finally, Russia recognizes, but does not seem overly concerned with, the significance of Asian powers. Immediate demands appear to be crowding out a strategic perspective in Moscow. At present, China faces its own uncertainties, and leaders in Moscow seem to view China primarily as a potential compatriot if the West squeezes the two of them. Relations with Japan are frozen by the impasse over the Northern Territories. The great economic boom of East Asia seems too distant to matter to Russia's present predicament.

- Russia's agenda. In sum, for the foreseeable future Russia has its hands full at home and in its immediate neighborhood. Survival has first priority. After Russia returns to strength, it will view its interests coldly, perhaps even resentfully, taking into account Russia's needs at the time. Those needs may include ties with the West; they are certain to include protecting and enhancing the security of a Russian nation that stretches across all of Eurasia, with few natural borders to check perceived enemies or to limit perceived opportunities for influence. In the meantime, Russia will use its place on the UN Security Council, its arms policies, and its looming presence in Europe to demonstrate that Russia cannot be ignored and that Russia's traditional interests should be respected.

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