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The most brutal war between Russian banks in the entire post-Soviet
history has drawn a line under the "Davos alliance" and the "rule of seven
banks" that emerged from it. The coincidence in time of two
events ONEKSIM, (Unexim), bank's victory at the Svyazinvest stock auction and the
finalizing of its property rights to the Norilsk Nickel pledge
portfolio and suggest that a single leader has emerged in Russian
business. Such a concentration of different kinds of resources (financial,
raw material, and political) in the hands of one corporation is something
undoubtedly new for Russia. And so far its consequences are absolutely
unclear. But it is obvious that such a dramatic redistribution of financial
power could not occur without equally momentous shifts in the sphere of
power as such. Moreover, all these shifts also required ideological
cover the fierce infighting at the pinnacle of the financial and
political pyramid had to be convincingly explained to the people
somehow it was simply necessary to present it as something
bigger and hence more decent than simple bickering over a fat
piece of pie. Otherwise, the degree of discreditation of the authorities as
such would become simply dangerous for public politicians.
Nevertheless, after all the justifications, versions, and explanations
presented by the participants in the "clash of the titans," the meaning of
the events remains completely foggy for the Russian public.
According to the version of the so-called "young reformers," who gave
political cover to the redistribution of financial might and property,
everything that has happened is a natural and logical step in the
development of a healthy competitive market economy, in which the strongest
wins and the bid is won by whoever offers the greater price. They brandish
cliches such as "transition from gangster capitalism to normal capitalism,"
"end of the era of favorites," and such.
At the same time, a serious conflict with part of the banking
establishment is God's gift for Boris Nemtsov. Because he came to power
with a program of "honest competitive capitalism" and had no ties to the
"Davos convention." In the logic of his public policy, the Svyazinvest
auction is a completely natural continuation of a bid on the procurement of
sugar for the military.
Chubays is in a much worse position: It is rather hard to explain to
the public why the same person who recently organized clearly fictitious
(prearranged) pledge auctions now is starting a new, honest life and will
be holding honest and transparent auctions. What especially suggests this
nasty thought is the fact that both the first and the most
scandalous Norilsk Nickel auction and this "honest and procedurally
impeccable" Svyazinvest auction were won by the same corporation. To this,
Chubays has a simple answer: We have to pay the military and the
budget-funded sphere; the state needs money, and I have been instructed by
the President to get it. Hence, the change of rules: Whoever gives more,
wins.
(We recall, though, that the budget crisis was hardly less severe at
the time of the "old rules" either...)
Analysts suggest two versions of events.
One interprets the "young reformers'" policy as a way of completely
shaking off the shackles of the "Davos convention."
In the environment of complete disintegration of the state apparat,
regional barons' autocracy, and a catastrophic budget crisis, Anatoliy
Chubays, the mutually agreed-upon "seven-banks commissar attached to
Yeltsin," was bound hand and foot by the "Davos convention." Any state
decision was carried out only to the extent that it was lucrative to the
financial moguls, supported by them (and oftentimes even informally
financed by them--out of budget funds).
Such a situation could not sit well with the people whose position
depended not so much on accounts, assets, and sales as on the power of
state authority and sociopolitical stability in the country. Who is the
master in the country, after all? Traditionally, Russia is indeed a
"society of power," and the less than decade-long free market
transformation has hardly removed this civilization-dependent limitation.
The summer banking war over the division of the remainder of state
property opened up a unique opportunity for Chubays and his team: to play
the financial moguls off against one another and achieve previously
unattainable independence.
Perhaps the key moment in this was the coming to power of Nemtsov, who
had no historical ties to the "seven banks rule," with his team of
provincials and his undisguised presidential ambitions. Nemtsov is bound to
think about the upcoming elections. And in this sense his interests are
much more pegged on the general situation in the country than on
private - even the most powerful - corporations.
All this is, however, only the "young reformers" own version. The
facts are, however, that Chubays and Nemtsov have grown so dangerously
close to one of the financial empires that this rapprochement could
transform into a dependence even more dangerous than the Davos one. The
intimate "material" connection between many "baby Chubayses" in the
government and ONEKSIM, (Unexim), could turn into a previously unimaginable degree of
economic favoritism, where state functions will be privatized no longer by
seven bank group members but by just one corporation.
On the other hand, this also is just a hypothesis. Of much more
interest is something else: How will it all end?
Most likely, the new correlation of forces in the world of big money
and in the government ;lparkeeping in mind Chernomyrdin's public humiliation in
the conduct of the final auction of Norilsk Nickel;rpar will be balanced in the
course of subsequent auctions, the most important of which - of
Rosneft - is expected soon. Russia is, after all, a monstrously rich
country, and there will be a piece of bread for everyone. That is why the
fights at the top usually are not to the death but to first blood.
The other aspect of the past banking war affects all citizens
directly. In Russian conditions, the schism in the financial oligarchy and
the public battle between powerful financial-political clans, the pluralism
of their interests and positions, represent the only guarantee of the
separation of power and property and at least partial insurance of rights
and freedoms, including the freedom of the press.
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